Th is article responds to Daniel Castelo's recent recommendation of the doctrine of divine impassibility to Pentecostals. In contrast to Castelo's proposal, this article argues that Pentecostals are justifi ed in dropping the term 'impassibility' and, moreover, that Pentecostals have a pneumatological reason for affi rming divine passibility implicit within their spirituality of speaking in tongues.
Building on his previous work on the doctrine of divine impassibility, Daniel Castelo recently recommended the doctrine of impassibility to Pentecostals. In doing this, Castelo is certainly going against a trend in both Pentecostal theology and contemporary theology at large.
1 While I appreciate the reasons that Castelo off ers for affi rming the doctrine of impassibility, in this article I will point out how Pentecostal theology also gives reason to affi rm divine passibility. While this might seem to contradict Castelo's recommendation of the doctrine, our recommendations can actually be complementary to one another. Nevertheless, in the end, I do think it best that Pentecostals (and others) drop the use of the term 'impassibility' in reference to God in contemporary theology.
Before turning to my recommendation of divine passibility, it is fi rst necessary to clarify Castelo's proposal. Castelo advocates the doctrine of divine impassibility to Pentecostals with the aim of recommending that Pentecostals develop an apophatic side to their theology, which would be consistent with apophatic characteristics of Pentecostal spirituality. He writes, 'Pentecostal experience of God and a certain account of divine impassibility go hand in hand'.
2 Castelo recalls times when Pentecostals have a quiet moment during a worship service when they sense the presence of God. In contrast to a frequent desire of Pentecostals to express themselves with many words, these quiet moments are 'the holy silence that occasionally emanates from the Spirit's hushing'.
3 Here Castelo identifi es an apophatic practice in Pentecostal spirituality. He believes this apophatic practice lends support to the use of the doctrine of impassibility in service to an apophatic doctrine of God and in service to Pentecostal theology in general. Th e overall idea is that, in contrast to those Pentecostals who have fully embraced the doctrine of divine passibility (without qualifi cations), a doctrine of impassibility is a means of reaffi rming divine transcendence and the limits of our knowledge of God.
At fi rst glance it might seem that Castelo is arguing in favor of the view that God is completely dispassionate and without emotion (a proposal that just about any contemporary theologian would fi nd problematic). It might seem this way because Castelo does not signifi cantly expand on his understanding of divine passibility in his recent article. However, Castelo's proposal becomes clearer when one reads his recommendation of divine impassibility to Pentecostals along with his other work on divine impassibility. In recommending the doctrine of divine impassibility, Castelo is not advocating for a full dismissal of divine passibility. Indeed, he recognizes that the contemporary critique of divine impassibility is valid to some extent. However, his concern is that 'divine passibility has to be checked and qualifi ed in order that it does not become overly sentimentalized or domesticated'. theologians are not in a situation of having to choose either impassibility or passibility, for both are necessary and even 'essential to one another'.
5
Castelo off ers two main reasons for affi rming that God is 'apathetic' or 'impassible'. First, he employs the doctrine of impassibility as an apophatic qualifi er. Here Castelo affi rms the work of Paul Gavrilyuk, who argues that Patristic theologians viewed God as passionate while at the same time employing the concept of impassibility as an apophatic qualifi er. To utilize the idea of divine impassibility as an apophatic qualifi er is to say that God's passions differ from human passions and that God does not have emotions that might seem morally problematic.
6 Th is is the point that Castelo is primarily concerned with in his recent article in the Journal of Pentecostal Th eology . Castelo's second overall reason for affi rming the doctrine of divine impassibility is that he wants to affi rm that God is impassible in his actions. Th at is, God is not inhibited by his suff ering-God is not ruled by his passions and, therefore, God remains in control of his actions. Castelo emphasizes that God suff ers only voluntarily and for the purpose of redemption.
7 With respect to Jesus Christ, specifi cally, Castelo emphasizes that he is impassible in the sense that Jesus does not suff er only as a martyr or rebel; rather, his suff ering is 'an act of solidarity [that] can be a hopeful, redemptive, and ultimately glorifying expression of God's love '. 8 To summarize, Castelo's recommendation of the doctrine of divine impassibility does not mean a rejection of divine passibility, but only that God does not have 'negative' passions that limit God's ability to control himself, and that God suff ers for the purpose of overcoming suff ering. In this sense, one might say that God suff ers impassibly.
It is true that theologians too frequently affi rm divine passibility without suffi cient qualifi cations. It is also true that theology must take account of the points that Castelo wishes to make with his doctrine of divine impassibility. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that one (Pentecostal or not) must include a doctrine of impassibility in one's theology in order to adequately address Castelo's concerns. In other words, I am not convinced that the doctrine of impassibility is necessary.
To highlight this point, the main theologian whom Castelo critiques with respect to divine passibility (Jürgen Moltmann) actually addresses some of Castelo's concerns, while at the same time dropping the term 'impassibility'. I agree with many of Castelo's critiques of Moltmann's doctrine of God.
9 At the same time, however, Moltmann does adequately address one of the reasons that leads Castelo to argue in favor of the doctrine of divine impassibilitynamely, that God in Christ suff ers voluntarily and for the purpose of redemption. First, Moltmann qualifi es his affi rmation of divine passibility as being voluntary when he asserts that the suff ering of God is ' active suff ering, the suff ering of love, in which one voluntarily opens himself to the possibility of being aff ected by another'.
10 Furthermore, Moltmann also affi rms that the suff ering of the Son of God on the cross is redemptive; therefore, he implicitly affi rms that the suff ering of God does not inhibit God's redemptive activity. Christ's death is salvifi c in that he died 'for us'. Moltmann writes, 'Th e phrase "died for our sins" means that the cause of his suff ering was our sins, the purpose of his suff ering is expiation for us, the ground of his suff ering is the love of God for us'.
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With these two affi rmations that the suff ering of the Son of God on the cross is voluntary and for salvifi c purposes, Moltmann addresses Castelo's second reason for affi rming divine impassibility, although without affi rming the doctrine of divine impassibility himself. One can address Castelo's fi rst reason for affi rming the doctrine of divine impassibility (i.e. the need for an apophatic qualifi er) easily enough simply by noting that human suff ering and divine suff ering are not one and the same. Th at is to say that when one speaks of divine suff ering, one has reached beyond the limits of human knowledge and language for one does not know precisely what it is like for God to suff er. It is clear then, that one can address the perceived need for the doctrine of impassibility without necessarily affi rming the term itself. However, one might wonder, why would one want to avoid using the terms 'apathetic' or 'impassibility' in reference to God? While I do not think it is necessary to drop the term 'impassibility' from Pentecostal theological vocabulary, it might be best to drop the term 'impassibility' simply because of how the term has been used throughout church history after the Patristic era and because of how the term is often understood (and used) in contemporary theology. When Castelo defends the idea of divine impassibility, his primary concern is not with defending the term itself. Rather, one of his main concerns (this is his starting point) is to correct misinterpretations of the way the Patristic Fathers employed the doctrine and to defend their use of the doctrine. He emphasizes that in the early church theologians used the idea of divine impassibility in a variety of ways and that taken on its own, apatheia largely did not mean 'indiff erence' to the early church when used in relation to God. On the contrary, the early church used apatheia in an attempt to safeguard the divine transcendence in an apophatic manner, especially within those contexts in which the notion of 'suff ering' was gaining acceptance as a category to be used in relation to the godhead.
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In making these observations, Castelo has done a great service to both historical and contemporary theologians. However, when it comes to appropriating the signifi cance of Patristic expressions of divine impassibility, one should not only take into account the Patristic theologians. One must also consider how the doctrine of divine impassibility has been employed in subsequent history. And the problem is that many medieval and contemporary expressions of divine impassibility are not consistent with Patristic formulations of the doctrine. For example, Th omas Aquinas suggested that God does love, and even that God loves all things, but that this is not a passion or feeling for God. Rather, love exists for God only as an act of the will. Th at is, God does loving things, but not out of passions. 13 In contemporary theology, Th omas Weinandy defends the doctrine of impassibility; and, although he affi rms that God experiences passions such as delight and joy, he argues that any metaphors of divine suff ering must be 'purged of the passible and emotional connotations' of human suff ering.
14 Th ese expressions of divine impassibility are not utilizing the idea of divine impassibility solely as an apophatic qualifi er. In fact, these expressions of the apathetic God are no more apophatic than contemporary expressions of divine passibility because these claims of impassibility aim to give specifi c content to the doctrine of God (saying that God is not passionate in a certain manner). Th eology must always adjust to its context. For the majority of theologians (and pastors) today, impassibility does not mean what it meant for many Patristic theologians nor what it means for Castelo. Even Castelo himself recognizes that 'the word "apathetic" in today's context suggests "indiff erent", "detached", and so forth '. 15 Given that the terms 'impassibility' and 'apathetic' are so often understood in this way in the contemporary context, it seems that the terms no longer serve the academy well and probably even less so the church at large. If the term 'impassibility' has taken on new (and objectionable) meanings through the history of theology, it may be best to drop the term impassibility (although it is not improper to use the term together with passibility, as Castelo does). Following from Castelo's work, it is clear that we do not need to drop the term on account of its overall Patristic usage. It is just that the Patristic usage is not all that needs to be taken into account.
Contemporary theology has off ered many reasons for affi rming the doctrine of divine passibility. Most of these come from Christological perspectives, which affi rm that the Son of God suff ered on the cross, and sometimes, by extension, that the Father and the Holy Spirit suff ered by virtue of their participation in this event. Beyond these common arguments in support of the doctrine of divine passibility, Pentecostals can also fi nd reason for affi rming the passibility of God in their spirituality. More specifi cally, a Pentecostal theology of speaking in tongues supports this doctrine.
Pentecostals speak in tongues for diff erent reasons on many diff erent occasions. Sometimes it is a joyous occasion of celebration and praise, sometimes it is during a time of turmoil, and at other times it is just when we are longing for something more than life currently off ers. In some of these occasions Pentecostals can fi nd a correlation between their personal groaning and the groaning of the Spirit who is praying through them as they speak in tongues. Paul writes of such experiences in Romans, when he writes that believers 'who have the fi rstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly' (8.23; cf. 2 Cor. 5.2) as we await our fi nal redemption and that, while we remain in our state of weakness, 'the Spirit himself intercedes for us with groans that words cannot express ' (8.26) .
As Pentecostals pray in tongues in this manner, they are not only guided by the Spirit in their prayers, but they also sense the passion of the Spirit of God. Th is passion of the Spirit comes as the Spirit voluntarily enters into the weak human state, shaping people into a new creation and drawing people into the kingdom of God. Like a mother giving birth to her child, the Spirit suff ers for redemption's sake that people might be born again, groaning with people in their groaning, and even helping people to groan when 'we do not know what we ought to pray for ' (Rom. 8.23) . Th is Pentecostal sensitivity to the groaning of the Spirit supports a doctrine of divine passibility.
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In conclusion, Pentecostal spirituality supports a Pentecostal doctrine of divine passibility. Castelo has correctly cautioned contemporary theologians that Patristic theologians generally did not use the term 'impassibility' in the same way that many people understand the term today, nor in the manner that many contemporary theologians think that the Patristic theologians used the term. However, it seems unnecessary for Pentecostals to continue to teach the impassibility of God given that there are other ways of making the qualifi cations regarding divine passibility than the route that Castelo takes. Furthermore, the term 'impassibility' can even be unhelpful in contemporary theology due to the high possibility that it will be misunderstood. In affi rming the doctrine of passibility I do hope that I am not among (in Castelo's words) those 'Pentecostal scholars who challenge unequivocally and without reserve the notion of divine impassibility'. 17 Castelo, 'An Apologia for Divine Impassibility', p. 124.
